Chinese interest in Jammu & Kashmir State territories swelled directly
from her expansion and absorption of the Central Asian Khanates and Tibet,
lying to the North and North-East of Jammu Kashmir State, in the Chinese
Empire. This expansion had been going on for centuries past through the
peculiar Chinese method of creating the myth of Chinese suzerainty over
all the smaller States situated on China's periphery which had the misfortune
of entering into any kind of relationship, voluntarily or involuntarily,
with the Chinese imperial Court at Peking. The Khanates of Tashkand and Yarkand, which were at one time flourishing outposts of India's Cultural
Empire as is evident from the Sanskrit origin of these names, are inhabited
by Uighur. The Kirghiz, Tartar, Tajik and Kazakh tribes of nomadic herdsmen
of Turkish origin had been converted to Islam in the wake of Arab and Turkish
expansion. Ethnically they represent a mixture of Indo-Aryan and Mongol
stocks. They had come under pressure of Czarist Russia which began to move
fast in Central Asia after her failure to expand south because of her defeat
in the Crimean War of 1854. To checkmate Russian plans of expansion and
keep this area within their own sphere of influence for the protection
of their imperial interests in India, the British deliberately encouraged
China, which was then too weak and decrepit to pose a threat to British
interests, to assert its suzerainty over these Khanates to prevent their
absorption by Russia. Thus began that rivalry between Russia and China
for controlling Mongolia and Central Asian Khanates which has continued
ever since. The Chinese in keeping with their well known method of signification
re-Christened the area controlled by them as Sinkiang.
in Sinkiang remained precarious for China so long as she was weak and divided.
But with the establishment of a communist regime in China in 1949, the
Chinese Communists extended their effective ways over Sinkiang through
ruthless repression. This resulted in a lot of local discontent and violent
outbursts such as that of the Kazakhs in 1949. But, Communist China consolidated
her position in Sinkiang by the early fifties. The Indian and British Consulates
in this area urere closed and a bamboo curtain was put between it and the
rest of the world. As a result the traditional trade between India and
Yarkand and Kashghar of which Leh was the main centre virtually came to
The story of
Sinkiang was repeated in Tibet soon after. Unlike the small and warring
Khanates of Central Asia, now divided between Russian Turkestan and Chinese
Turkestan (Sinkiang), Tibet had been for at least two thousand years an
independent State with a dist inct personality and definite international
boundaries, though its cultural influence extended far beyond them. With
the establishrnent of the Manchu dynasty in China in the 17th Century,
informal relationship between China and Tibet based on a personal relationship
of a religious preceptor and a lay patron between the Dalai Lama and the
Manchu emperor began. Later, the Chinese Government tried to derive some
kind of a Chinese supremacy over Tibet from this relationship which the
successive Tibetan Government went on repudiadting and resisting to the
best of their capacity and strength.
Early in the
20th century Czarist Russia sought to gain some influence at Lhasa through
Dorjief, a Mongolian Buddhist priest. To counteract the suspected Russian
influence, the British forced their way into Tibet in l903 through a Military
Mission led by Colonel Younghusband. The Lhasa Convention of 1904 gave
the British a special position in Tibet in respect of trade and other matters.
But to protect themselves against the Russian charge of aggression and
to keep Russian influence, which was what really mattered for the British
at that time out of Tibet, the British in a way resurrected the myth of
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet which in the words of Younghusband himself
was just a "farce" and "a political affectation".
Even this farce
of Chinese suzerainty was destroyed in 1911 when the Manchu regime was
overthrown by Dr. Sun Yat Sen's revolutionary movement. The Tripartite
Simla Conference of 1913-14 in which the representatives of China, Tibet
and British Government of India met on equal footing to settle Tibet-China
frontier finally buried the myth of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet which
then began to function as a full, independent State according to known
international usage and practice.
With the withdrawal
of the British from India in August 1947 all treaty obligations and commitments
of the British Indian Government in respect of Indials neighbors devolved
upon the Governmnt of free India. Sinkiang and Tibet flanked India in the
North from the Pamirs to Burma. Pakistan nowhere came in contact with either
Sinkiang or Tibet. The interests of free India demanded that Chinese influence
was kept out of these strategic border States as far as possible. Sinkiang
was then in a ferment. But it is difficult to say what effective help India
could have extended to Nationalist Kazakhs and Uighurs in their battle
for freedom against Communist China.
in regard to Tibet was different. India which had inherited special rights
and obligations in Tlbet was expected both on moral grounds as well as
in the interests of her national security to help Tibet to preserve her
freedom so that she might continue to be a buffer between India and China.
She could have achieved this end by helping Tibet to secure membership
on U.N.O. or by securing guarantee of non-interference in Tibet from the
Communist Government of China before she gave recognition to it in 1949.
But Pt. Nehru,
the sole architect of India's foreign policy, would not allow such mundane
considerations to influence his policy towards his new found friends of
Communist China. Like the proverbial fools who rush in where the angels
fear to tread, the great Pandit of India not only failed to get any assurance
from Communist China in 1949 but, what is worse, did nothing to prevent
her from committing flagrant aggression against a weak and peace loving
Tibet in 1950. The argument that India was not in a position to halt Chinese
aggression in Tibet in 1950 is fallacious and misleading. India with her
three military posts within Tibet and with the support of the free world
could have surely and effectively checkmated the Communist Chinese designs
over Tibet at that time. Any sacrifices in men and material that India
might have been required to make to save Tibet then would have been much
less than the sacrifices she has made and will be required to make in future
for shirking her responsibility in 1950.
bungling in regard to Tibet like his bunglings in Kashmir did not end there.
After having made a gift of Tibet to China with all the destruction of
monasteries and genocide that followed it in the name of peace, he started
such a campaign of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai-ism that any objective assessment
of Chinese aims in occupying Tibet, its fast signification through settlement
of large number of Chinese there and building of large military cantonments
all along the Indian frontier began to be pooh-poohed by the Indian Press
and Political elite. Nehru Chou fraternization culminated in the so-called
"Panch-Sheel" Treaty of 1954 between India and China regarding Tibet;
"Panch Sheel" literally meant five norms of good conduct, viz. mutual respect
for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non- aggression,
mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and
mutual benefit and peace ful co-existence.
By this Treaty
India gave de jure recognition to a de facto aggressive occupation of Tibet
by Communist China and also surrendered all the special rights including
that of running Tibet's postal, telegraph and telephone services and stationing
troops at a number of places within Tibet inherited by her from the British
Government of India. It was a great diplomatic victory for China and an
unpardonable blunder on the part of the Indian Government. At one stroke
it converted the Indo- Tibetan frontier into an India-China frontier. While
signing this death warrant for Tibet and invitation to Comrnunist China
to explore fresh fields for expansion across the Himalayas, the Indian
Prirne Minister failed to get even an unequivocal acceptance from China
of the age-old Indo-Tibet frontier the Eastern sector of which had come
to be known as the McMahon Line after the British officer who first surveyed
The story of
Chinese aggression against India begins with the signing of this Treaty
which was aptly described in the Indian Parliament by Late Acharaya J.B.
Kripalani, a former President of the ruling Congress Party, as "born in
sin". The Treaty was signed on April 29, 1954 and the Chinese forces crossed
over into Bara Hoti early in June of the same year.
made her position secure in Tibet which was described by Mao 'Tse-Tung
in 1939 as the palm of a hand of which Laddakh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and
Arunachal Pradesh, were five fingers, Communist China began to prepare
for controling these fingers. To that end it built military and air bases
in Tibet and developed communications for supplying the large forces deployed
there with sinews of life and war. Tibet itself being mostly barren and
unproductive, the supplies could come either from the Chinese mainland
in the North and the East or from Sinkiang in the North-West of Tibet.
Western Tibet bordering on Laddakh being far removed from Lhasa which itself
is at a long distance from the Chinese mainland, a direct road link between
Western Tibet and Sinkiang became a strategic necessity for China.
to build the road, the Chinese found that the shortest and easiest route
lay through the Aksai Chin region of Laddakh, an integral part of India
with which she had not long ago signed the Panch-Sheel Treaty. She began
with cartographic aggression. The Chinese maps showed large parts of Laddakh
including Aksai Chin and a narrow belt of territory along the Baltistan
and Gilgit border with Sinkiang as Chinese Territory.
situation in Jammu & Kashmir State and the attitude of the Government
of India suited China's purpose admirably. During the Maharaja's rule an
effective administrative control had been extended to the remotest parts
of Laddakh, Baltistan and Gilgit. The Laddakh-Tibet border settled by tradition
and usage of centuries had been confirmed by the Treaty of 1842 between
Maharaja Gulab Singh and the Government of Dalai Lama. The State officials
who were deputed for the frontier duty were required to go right up to
the border at least once in their three year term. As a result there was
no scope for confusion or uncertainty about the frontier.
But ever since
power was transferred to the Kashmiri dominated National Conference, administration
of Laddakh and other outlying parts of the State outside the Kashmir valley
began to be neglected. The new officials who were appointed more for their
political affiliations than for adminstrative aptitudes, seldom moved out
of Leh. The Government of India too did not bother itself to take adequate
steps to guard or patrol the border. The intoxication of Bhai-Bhai-ism
had gone so deep into its head that it could not even think of any aggression
from China. Kushak Bakula, the Head Lama of Laddakh and then Minister for
Laddakh Affairs in the Jammu & Kashmir Government, informed the State
Assembly on March 1, 1963 that he, had warned the Governments of Kashmir
and India about the Chinese plans of aggression after his visit to lake
Mansarowar and Lhasa in 1954. Similar warnings had come from other quarters
as well. But nothing perceptible was done either by the State Government
or the Government of India to draw the People's attention to the Chinese
threat or to checkmate it. Maybe the Communists within the Kashmir Cabinet
were privy to the Chinese game. As a result the Chinese were able to follow
up their cartographic aggression by actual aggression. They built the road
linking Sinkiang with Gartok in Western Tibet right through Aksai Chin
and aiso occupied a number of strategic outposts.
In the meantime,
Pakistan too had started hobnobbing with Communist China. Apart from a
direct link with Sinkiang provided to her by the occupied territory of
Gilgit and Baltistan, she thought it worthwhile to offer the bait of Laddakh
to China if the latter in return could help her to get Kashmir Valley or
at least remain neutral in the dispute over it. Her desire for such an
understanding with Communist China had been heightened since the open and
public communist Russian support to India during the visit of Russian leaders
to India in 1955. No wonder, therefore, that it was reported in a number
of Indian and foreign newspapers in 1956 that Mr. S.H. Suhrawardy, the
then Prime Minister of Pakistan, had during his visit to Peking suggested
to his Chinese counterpart, that such a partition of Jammu ashmir State
would give Kashmir Valley to Pakistan, Lacdakh to China and Jammu to India.
have actually transpired between Suhrawardy and Chou-en-Lai, the course
of events as they have unfolded themselves since then have conclusively
proved that China had become actively interested in the disintegration
of the Jammu and Kashmir State so that she also might share the spoils
about Chinese intrusion into Indian territory began to pour in through
unofficial sources after that. But until as late as July 1958, the Government
of India in a 'Note verbale' to the Chinese counsellor in Indian had the
temerity to say that "they would not like to believe that unilateral action
has been taken by the Government of People's Republic of China with whom
their relations are of the friendliest, to enforce alleged territorial
claims in the region."
of India woke up to the Chinese hostile intentions and aggressive occupation
of Indian territory in Laddakh only when the Chinese arrested an Indian
patrol party on normal routine duty in the northern part of Aksai Chin
and detained and ill-treated it for five weeks in September 1958.
notes sent by the Indian Foreign Secretary to the Chinese counterpart on
Octot.er 18 and November 3 were countered by China with the assertion that
Aksai Chin area belonged to China and that Indian soldiers had intruded
into Chinese territory.
up the occupation of Aksai Chin by aggressive patrollings and encroachments
into the region of Western Pangong lake in Laddakh where she arrested six
Indian policemen and also established a camp at Spanggur in inspite of
repeated Indian protests.
20, 1959 a Chinese military force advanced forty miles into Indian territory
in the Chang C hempo valley of southern Laddakh and opened fire on an Indian
patrol near the Kong-Ka-Pass in which nine Indian Police man were killed
and ten others were taken prisoners and subjected to very harsh and inhuman
an explosive situation. Press and public opinion in India reacted to this
outrage by the Chinese very sharply. It forced the Indian Prime Minister,
Pt. Nehru, who had been systematically trying to minimize the gravity of
the situation by first concealing the fact of Chinese intrusions from the
Indian public and Parliament and then belittling the importance of the
territory occupied by China by describing it as barren and desolate "where
not a blade of grass grows", to pay heed to the popular sentiment. He made
a belated effort in his letter of November 18, 1959 to persuade his friend, Chou-en-Lai to ease the situation by withdrawing as an interim measure,
the Chinese troops beyond the traditional boundary alignment shown on Indian
maps while he on his part undertook to withdraw Indian troops to the line
which China claimed as her boundary. This offer amounted to a clear surrender
to the aggressor in so far as her claim that Laddakh-Tibet boundary was
undefined was accepted and a 'no man's land' was sought to be created on
the Indian soil itself.
But even this
offer was rejected by Chou-en-Lai who in his reply of December 16, 1959
to Pt. Nehru, bluntly asserted: "This area has long been under Chinese
jurisdiction and is of great importance to China. Since the Ching dynasty,
this area has been the traffic artery linking up the vast regions of Sinkiang
and Western Tibet. As far back as the latter half of 1950, it was along
the traditional route in this area that units of the Chinese People's Liberation
Army entered the Ari area of Tibet from Sinkiang to guard the frontiers.
In the nine years since then, they have been making regular and busy use
of this route to bring supplies. For up to eight or nine years since the
peaceful liberation of Sinkiang and Iibet when the units of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army began to be stationed in and patrol this area
until September 1958 when intrusion of the area by the armed Indian personnel
occurred, so many activities were carried out by the Chinese side in this
area under its jurisdiction and yet the Indian side was utterly unaware
visit to New Delhi and his direct talks with Pt. Nehru in April, 1960,
failed to improve matters. Both Premiers, however, agreed to appoint teams
of officials to jointly examine all relevant documents in support of the
stands of the two Governments and submit a report within six months. The
Government of India published the report of the officials of the two sides
in February 1960. The report made it clear on the basis of vast and indisputable
evidence that the traditional boundary between lndia and Tibet was that
shown by India and that China had made unwarrantec claim to about 50,000
sq. miles of Indian territory and was in unlawful occupation of about 12,000
sq. miles of this territory in Laddakh.
of China for long did not even acknowledge the existence of the report.
Finally in May 1962, they published a garbled and truncated version of
the Chinese section of this report. Simultaneously, Chinese intrusions
into various sectors of the Indian frontier were stepped up. New check-posts
and roads to link them with rear bases were constructed and the Chinese
troops began advance partolling from the posts.
As time passed,
the Chinese action and the tone of their replies to Indian protest notes,
which were sent in abundance, became more and more curt and threatening.
On April 30, 1962, the Government of China announced that they had ordered
patrolling in the whole sector from the Karakoram Pass to the Kong-Ka-Pass
and demanded that India withdraw two of her posts which were situated well
within the Indian territory and threatened that if the Government of India
failed to comply with the demands, the Government of China would resume
patrolling along the entire boundary.
relations were thus getting strained to a breaking point, Pakistan also
stepped up its anti- Indian campaign. The main reason for this was the
growing internal discontent against the Martial Law regime in Pakistan
particularly in its Eastern wing, and the consequent weakening of the position
of General Ayub. He too, therefore, thought it convenient to divert his
people's attention from internal difficulties by whipping up their frenzy
about Kashmir by jingoistic talk and adoption of new pressure tactics.
They included strengthening of the so-called Azad Kashmir Government, which
began to claim an independent status and started hurling threats of armed
invasion of Kashmir unshackled by the international commitments of Pakistan
and launching of a virulent campaign against India and the USA in the Pakistan
press. The USA was made a special target of attack for her continued economic
aid to India which was getting aid from the USSR as well.
At the same
time, possibilities of closer relations with com munist China whose anti-India
tirade was finding quite a sympathetic echo in Pakistan's press, began
to be explored so that India could be harrassed on both fronts. The possibility
of such an eventuality had been hinted by the Chinese Ambassador. In India
in his note of May 16, 1959 to the Foreign Secretary of India in which
he had said that it would not be possible for India to fight on two fronts
- China and Pakistan - and therefore she must make up with C.hina. In the
background of earlier Sino- Pak confabulations this veiled hint could not
have gone unnoticed in Pakistan.
of Pakistan and China drawing nearer to each other that thus began culminated
in the announcement of May 31, 1962, about the agreement between the two
Governments to enter into negotiations to locate and align the border between
Sinkiang on the one hand and Baltistan and Gilgit regions of Jammu &
Kashmir State which had been illegally occupied by Pakistan, on the other.
This was a clear indication that China and Pakistan were getting together
to achieve their respective territorial ambition at the cost of India.
policy makers who, in spite of the pronounced hostility and naked agression
of Communist China, were still not prepared to concede that their policy
toward China had failed, were flabbergasted by this volte face of China.
As in the case of the McMahon Line, they had been banking on the verbal
assurance of Chou-en-Lai to the Indian Ambassador in Peking in 1956 and
to R.K. Nehru, the Secretary General of the Indian External Affairs Ministry
in 1961 that China considered Kashmir to be a part of India. But they ignored
the fact that Communist China unlike Communist Russia had never publicly
supported India's stand regarding Kashmir. They were in fact living in
a fool's paradise which was completely shattered by the Chinese Foreign
Minister in his note to India dated May 31, 1962 which bluntly asked: "can
you cite any document to show that we have ever said that Kashmir is a
part of India"? lt was a major victory for Pakistan. She had got the reward
for hobnobbing with Communist China over the head of the USA which had
been arming her on the understanding and in the hope that she would stand
up against Communist Chinese and Russian expansion whenever required.
attitude toward India and China when the mass invasion of Communist China
both in Laddakh and NEFA sectors of India's northern frontier began on
September 8, 1962, could therefore be well anticipated. Pakistan's press
systematically justified the Chinese stand and ridiculed India. Pakistan
in fact was the only country of the non-Communist world which openly supported
China and in that it went a step further than Albania, North Vietnam and
North Korea. The attitude and conduct of the Muslims in Tezpur and elsewhere
in the affected regions of India clearly pointed to a tacit understanding
between China and Pakistan regarding the invasion and the attitude to be
adopted by the Pro- Pakistan Muslims of India about it.
As the Chinese
offensive mounted and India's unpreparedness became woefully exposed, the
government of India was forced to request the USA, the UK and other friendly
countries for help to meet the Communist advance. Realizing the magnitude
of the threat and its dangerous implications for the entire free world,
the USA and the UK responded magnificently. Pakistan too should have come
to the help of India both because the Chinese Comrnunist expansion was
as much a threat to her as to India and also because she had been given
arms aid by the USA on the specific understanding that she would use it
against Communist expansion and aggression whether it came from the USSR
or from China. But Pal;istan not only did not make any friendly gesture
to India but what was worse, she vehemently protested to the USA and the
UK for having extended military aid to India.
of Pakistan must have come as a shock and an eye-opener to the USA. It
only confirmed the Indian view that Pakistan had obtained military aid
from the USA only for use against India and not for assisting the free
world in containing Communist expansion.
as she did, Pakistan lost an excellent opportunity of reversing the trend
of Indo-Pak relations since 1947. Had Pakistan openly and unreservedly
come to the aid of India in her time of need, there might have been created
the necessary fund of goodwill and proper atmosphere for the settlement
of all Indo-Pak disputes including the one regarding Kashmir in a friendly
spirit of give and take. But in view of later developments, there are reasons
to believe that Pakistan stood committed to China not to go to India's
help and that some secret deal about the distribution of Assam territory
had been arrived at between the two before China started the invasion.
That explains the refusal of Muslims in Assam to evacuate Tezpur when evacuation
of its civil population was ordered by the authorities.
It also explains
the assertion that there was an agreement between China and Pakistan that
the territory to the north of the Brahmaputra would be annexed by China
and that lying to its south would be annexed by Pakistan. The fact that
most of the Communist workers who were active in Assam also happened to
be ex-Muslim Leaguers well known for their pro-Pakistan activities, lent
further support to this assumption.
of the USA in this situation was really difficult. She had armed Pakistan
to the teeth at a huge cost. Now she was rushing pressing military supplies
to India. Her aim in both cases was to checkmate Communist expansion. How
could her public opinion reconcile to the fact that the aid she had already
given to Pakistan was nct being used for the purpose for which it had been
given and that there was possibility of the arms supplied by the USA to
Pakistan and India being used against each other instead of being used
against Communist China. It therefore became an obsession with the American
governrnent to bring India and Pakistan together somehow so that India
may at least be able to shift a part of its forces deployed for defense
against Pakistan for fighting against China. The British Government also
shared this viewpoint which began to influence the Indian opinion as well.
while the Chinese were fast advancing into Arunachal and Laddakh, the American
and British political and military missions led by Mr. Averell Harriman,
US Assistant Secretary of State, and Mr. Duncan Sandys, British Commonwealth
Secretary, who had specially come to India to assess the situation and
the aid needed by India immediately prevailed upon Pt. Nehru and President
Ayub to affix their signatures to a joint com munique which was issued
simultaneously in New Delhi and Rawalpindi on November 30, 1962. The Communique
of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that a renewed
effolt should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their
two countries on Kashmir and other re1ated matters so as to enable India
and Pakistan to live side by side in peace and friendship.
they have decided to start discussions at an early date with the object
of reaching an honorable and equitable settlement.
be conducted initially at the ministerial level. At the appropriate stage
direct talks will be held between Mr. Nehru and President Ayub."
to have direct talks between Pakistan flnd India on ministerial level to
discuss Indo-Pak disputes particularly the one regarding Kashmir, placed
India in an awkward situation. In effect it amounted to India agreeing
to let Pakistan retain her fruits of aggression and have something more
in the bargain. The circumstanees leading to the agreement and the time
chosen for talks made their success doubtful even before they began. They
could lead to the desired result only if there was equal realization on
both sides of the gravity of the situation and indivisibility of Indo-Pak
defence against a threat like the one posed by Communist China. But there
was no evidence that there was any such realization in Pakistan. Leading
newspapers of Pakistan continued their tirade and denuciation of the USA
for coming to the rescue of India. They acclaimed China as a friend and
openly declared that there was no question of Pakistan going to the help
of India against China even af ter getting Kashmir which they insisted
must be handed over to Pakistan immediately.
On the other
hand Pt. Nehru, even though he had signed the joint communique under the
stress of circumstances, had his own reservations and doubts which were
betrayec in the several statements he made before and after the signing
of the communique. Apart from his personal attachment to Kashmir, the fear
of national reaction to any further surrender to Pakistan and the pressure
of his Communist and pro-Communist friends inside and outside the Government,
who were interested in sabotaging the Western aid and maintaining the pro-
Russian bias of India's foreign policy in the name of non- alignment, kept
him wavering about the advisability of holding any talks and the limit
to which India could go once such talks got going.
of the success of the talks were further dimmed by the unilateral cease-fire
ordered by the Chinese Government on November 21, 1962. The motives of
the Chinese in ordering a cease-fire in their hour of victory will remain
a matter of conjecture. But surely one of them was to sabotage the possibility
of closer collaboration between India and the West. They also wanted to
save the Communist Party, their political vanguard in India, and also its
friends and patrons inside the Indian Government from isolation and annihilation.
was keen to prevent an understanding between India and Pakistan for her
own reasons, the ruling circles of Pakistan were keen to take advantage
of the situation and put maximurn pressure on India and the USA to secure
their pound of flesh in the form of Kashmir. Announcement was made of the
decision of Pakistan to sign a border pact with China just on the eve of
the first round of talks which opened at Rawalpindi on January 30, 1963,
and the signing of the Indo-Pak pact at Peking by Z.A. Bhutto, the Pakistan
Foreign Minister and Chief Delegate at the Indo-Pak Talks, and Marshal
Chen- Yi, the Foreign Minister of China. On March 3, l963 just a week before
the opening ol the fourth round of the talks at Calcutta was a calculated
move to that end. These pressure tactics coupled with her fantastic demand
for the whole of the State except just three thousand sq. miles of South
Eastern tip of Jammu region made the eventual failure of these talks.
of the direct talks in spite of intense behind the scene activity by the
British and the American diplomats at New Delhi and Rawalpindi added to
the already existing bittlerness between the two countries. But they helped
in clearing the air and removing some of the prevailing misconceptions
about the attitudes and bona-fides of two countries regarding the basic
question of Indo-Pak relations in general and Kashmir issue in particular.
For instance, it now became quite evident that Pakistan was interested
more in extorting fresh commitments and scoring diplomatic points over
India for future use against her than in finding an honorable and equitable
settlement of the dispute as such.
glee at the Chinese aggress;on against India and her growing fraternization
with Communist China and the timing of the Sino-Pak border pact, for which
her Foreign Minister specially went to Peking, pointed to the inescapable
conclusion that she was more interested in a rapprochement with Communist
China than with democratic India.
of Pakistan to make any commitment about joint action with India to fight
out the Chinese menace and her persistent rejection of the Indian offer
of a "no war Pact", which was repeated during the talks as well, made it
further clear that there was little hope of actual disengagement of their
forces in the State even if India surrendered the Kashmir valley to her.
This attitude of Pakistan provided the basis for the fear expressed by
a number of responsible Indian leaders about the existence of certain secret
Articles in the Sino-Pak pact providing for collaboration between Pakistan
and Communist China to achieve their respective territorial and political
objectives at the cost of India.
narrated above confirmed the view that Pakistan so long as it exists would
continue to be hostile to India. Her very existence depends on keeping
the anti-Hindu and anti Indian frenzy among her Muslim population at a
very high pitch. She will pick up some other apple of discord to keep this
frenzy on, even if Kashmir issue is settled to her satisfaction. It is
this need to keep up the tension which impels Pakistan to follow a foreign
policy opposite to that of India. When India was drifting toward the Communist
block, Pakistan joined the Western bloc to secure its diplomatic, moral
and material support against India. When Communist China's unprovoked aggression
forced India, to make a re-appraisal of her foreign poliey and draw closer
to the Western countires which came to her help in the hour of her need,
Pakistan began moving toward Communist China.
The one man
who felt most disconcerted by these developments was Pt. Nehru, the sole
arehitect of Indian policy in regard to Jammu and Kashmir. Chinese invasion
had come as a rude shock to him. He had built his foreign policy particularly
in regard to China and Tibet on the assumption that no socialist country
could commit aggression and that there could be no danger to India from
China. His dream was shattered. As he himself admitted, he had been living
in an artificial world of his own imagination. China's attack and humiliating
defeat of India literally broke him.
last troubled months, two things weighed heavily on his heart. He wanted
to clear the decks for succession of his daughter Indira Gandhi, to his "Gaddi." He also wanted to make peace with
Sh. Abdullah and find a peaceful
solution of Kashmir problem aceeptable to him.
the first objective through the so called Kamraj plan. Senior leaders like
Morarji Desai who could legitimately stake their claim for leadership of
the Congress Parliamentary Party, after this death, were removed from the
cabinet under this plan.
It also helped
him to get rid of Bakshi Gulam Mohammed who had been instrumental in the
ouster of Sh. Abdullah in 1953, and had been in power in Kashmir ever since.
His removal was necessary to withdraw the conspiracy case against Sh. Abdullah
which had been going on since 1958. The case was withdrawn and Sh. Abdullah
released in April 1964. It was followed up by Pt. Nehru with a new- initiative
to solve the Kashmir problem through direct talks with President Ayub of
Pakistan. But it failed to take off.