Kashmir - What Went Wrong

Kashmir - What Went Wrong

The oft-repeated statement that the Indians have been rather poor in both their conceptual as well as executive endeavours sounds no where as true as in our tackling of the terrorist menace in Kashmir. It has not been errors but blunders all the way. Not only the political leadership but also the military top brass have been slow in evolving an adequate response to the situation in Kashmir.

Soviet Intervention

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan provided Pakistan everything it needed to unleash a new war of subversion against India-a secure arms pipeline, funds-diverted from narco-terrorism, mercenaries and American diplomatic support. Jehadist Army did not understand zia’s doctrine of proxy-war-'make them wither on the wane’ and missed the strategic fallouts of Soviet intervention. Pakistan kept us busy in Punjab all the while it went about making preparations for subversion in Kashmir. Army failed to read moves of Jamaat and could not correlate Jamaat’s political gameplan with military game-plan. Visits of Saudi intelligence chief and other high-level emissaries to Kashmir in early eighties were not meant to discuss weather.  . By 1984 reports were available that ISI had started dumping arms in Kupwara. Lack of source-running became problem for Indian army to trace these dumps. Civil intelligence agencies had kept Army fully posted with threats. Reports regarding Kashmiri boys undergoing training across the border were available as early as 1983. Army was also advised to pursue the plan of strategic satellite locations in 1986. Had it been implemented there would have been no fidayeen attacks. Army generals were not able to discern threat perception or to speak militarily, ‘read the battle’.

Army failed to sensitise political leadership on the threats to source-running due to politico-terrorist and administration-terrorist nexus. What were the undertones and implications of dangerous Resettlement Bill? Why was Pandit community being targetted as fifth columnist in Atish-Chinar? By August 1989, as many as 2600 boys were reported to have crossed the border for receiving training in subversion.

How Army was handling the job in the incipient stage of the insurgency, has been best explained by two senior Army officers themselves. Brig. Vijay K.Nair laments:

“The military hierarchy paid scant attention to the increasing internal turmoil, which it considered beyond its ambit. In the middle and late 80’s when Pakistan started training subversives and providing them with the arms required for insurgency, the Indian side displayed a comprehensive lack of appropriate intelligence. Even the military sources did not know, till it was too late, that large-scale infiltration with arms had been going on for about two years. There was obvious loss of contact with ground realities”.

Lt. Gen. Vijay Madan, the military strategist remarks.

“To believe that the Govt. its intelligence agencies, the army guarding the LoC in J&K and the Paramilitary forces similarly employed, none had a clue of what was brewing across the LoC since at least 1986 onwards, if not earlier, is to stretch one’s credulity to unimaginable limits. Hundreds of youth were sent across mountain passes for arming and training in PoK and our picquets and patrols on the LoC remained ignorant of such passage speaks poorly of these responsible for guarding the frontiers. That a number of those youngmen went to Afghanistan for on-the-job training in insurgency operations was obviously unknown to us till recently. Even if it was, we were unable to add it all up and arrive at any worthwhile inference about what was going to hit us in the Valley. Immense quantities of sophisticated arms and ammunition were brought into the Valley without knowledge or interception. That this was done over difficult passes and impassable terrain is no excuse for our failure, though it certainly speaks highly of people who oppose us. Assuming this information was available, then why no suitable action taken nor any alarm bells rung? There can be no doubt that initially the trouble in Kashmir was allowed to gain momentum because of sheer neglect”.

Initial Lapses

Border management was absent. For quite a few months in 1989-90 borders were not porous but open. It was around this time that Sopore, Kupwor, Apor’ became a phenomenon. Kashmiris thought that either BSF manning the border was involved or there was some understanding to hand over Kashmir on a platter. This feeling strengthened when BSF pickets in Srinagar city were suddenly removed and mass processions demanding secession were allowed. Azadi was round the corner. Why not to be with the winning side’ feeling enveloped by the populace. A large section of uncommitted or neutral population at this stage switched allegiance to the secessionists. All this time Army continued to follow concept of peace-time deployment i.e. Army was in barracks, and BSF was manning the border.

There was total absence of decisive orders after exfiltration and infiltration became a regular affair.

Kashmir insurgency has followed the copy-book. First, there were selected isolated blasts by militants to show their arrival and gauge response of people. Then there were selective killings to silence the dissent. Next the terrorists declared their political objective by launching a campaign of ethnic-cleansing against Kashmiri Hindus. Whether it was JKLF or Hizbul Mujahideen, all this was being done in the name of Jehad.

Army reacted to the initial phase of terrorist violence from a defensive mode. No counter-insurgency doctrine tailored to requirements in Kashmir was evolved. 15th Corps was not clear about political or military objectives. There were frantic knee-jerk reactions. Troops were inducted and launched. Since there was no thinking, everybody followed his own doctrine or experience gained in North-East, Sri Lanka, Punjab or against Naxalites. It was a situation of free for all.

Army leadership was also overawed by thinking that it is a political problem and not a military problem. Army officialdom did not define takes for juniors though there was no paucity of ideas. The result was-initiative passed on to militants. Militants took advantage of this defensive response. General Zaki’s promotion as security advisor did not help the Army either. He interfered too much and the Army brass did not like it. Even as a tactician, he did not display good military acumen. It was during his time that Sopore became a fortress for militants and mercenaries. Main finances of militants came from Sopore. It goes to the credit of BSF that it launched a decisive campaign to flush out terrorists from Sopore.

Lack of a clear counter-insurgency doctrine induced a strange psychology. Troops and the commanders became obsessed with survival of self and the unit and finishing tenure without any controversy. They concentrated on safe passage for convoys, not leaving adequate troops for counter-insurgency deployment. Two divisions were reserved for ‘Road Opening Party’. The Army became ‘Road Masters’ or ‘Road Marshals’. How was it possible that during the day Army would act as ‘ROP’ and launch counter-insurgency operations at night? There were hardly any troops left for conducting counter-insurgency.

This was the time when militancy was cent percent indigenous. Militants were not battle-hardened nor were they tactically sound. Their training was inadequate and militants were also less motivated. Had there been vision to evolve a counter-insurgency doctrine, Army could have launched a no holds barred campaign to smash the militancy, decimate the leadership and the cadre. Other duties could have been relegated to BSF or the CRPF. Teeth of the militancy could have been taken out. Blunders at the combat level did not go amist by senior army commanders. General Madan rightly describes the period from January 1990 to till end of 1993 as “one of the wasted efforts”. He notes.

“The Higher Hqs at Delhi or Udhampur had no clue on how to handle matters and the higher Hqs at Srinagar spent its time carrying out small unit operations rather than ensuring that a proper atmosphere was created in order to give the psychological space for manoeuvre to the cutting edge i.e. the fighting units to enable them to carry out their operations more aggressively and in a proactive manner”.

At the militancy level no two insurgency can be dealt within an identical manner. The approach by the armed forces will depend on the nature of the causes, vulnerabilities of the militants and the people supporting them, levels of militarisation achieved by the insurgents, access to and nature of foreign support and the availability of sound intelligence. In 1990-93 Army leadership did not till inducting troops understand about genesis of the problem, local psyche of the people and modus operandi of militants in a particular area.

Shift to Rural Areas

Kashmir terrorist movement initially started as an urban insurgency. Two of the most disastrous results of this period of military muddle were that militancy was allowed to spread from urban to rural areas. Had correction at the appropriate military level been taken to control the towns, known drills to isolate them from the countryside put into practice, it is more in than likely that the problem would have remained confined to a few towns and within certain specific areas inside them. The other  fallout of bad planning at combat level and sloppy psychological efforts was delivery of neutral or uncommitted population to militants. Was Army leadership so naive as not to appreciate what was good for winning the war in Kashmir? “Suggestions on all these aspects were made and well in time. They were ignored due to personal biases, lack of conviction and sheer lack of military acumen”, laments a former General.

Pir Pantsal Control

By the time the Army leadership realised what had gone wrong it was too late. Pakistan had begun inducting battle-hardened mercenaries and gained direct control of all terrorist groups. Section, Flatoon and Battalion “commanders” were  all Pakistanis. It was at this stage that it dawned on Army to do something.

With induction of foreign mercenaries, there was better professionalism and quality of combat was upgraded. To blunt the new strategies of the Army, terrorists decided to force dispersal of army by occupying Pir Pantsal line in Doda, Rajouri and Udhampur districts. Terrorists’ objective was to dominate inhospitable terrain and gain automatic edge over the Valley by drawing Army to fight in this terrain. Army strategists did not appreciate it.

Army had options to foil this design by denying the terrorists hideouts and gain control of this strategic region. This was possible through sending long range patrols (which they are doing now), aerial reconnaissance and dominating the routes. One brigade strength of soldiers was enough to achieve this objective. With terrorists having dug deep, now even one division strength is insufficient to meet this task.

Fallout of allowing terrorists to dominate Pir Pantsal region was something the political and military cost of which was quite heavy. It forced dispersal of Army over a large and inhospitable area. Pakistan gained propaganda mileage that whole of J&K was up in arms. Srinagar-Jammu national highway became insecure and more troops were needed for road opening. Ethnic-cleansing campaigns of non-Muslims started in these Muslim-majority districts and Cis-trans Chenab belt came under terrorist campaign. Political conspiracies to delink Doda via ‘Greater Muslim Kashmir Plan’, ‘Kathwari Plan’ or ‘Regional Autonomy Report’ were hatched with strong repercussions for national security .

Failure to deny the hideout to terrorists kept routes of ‘infiltration and ex-filtration in Pir Pantsal open. Heavy infestation of militants in Anantnag district is fallout of this. Helicopters were not used to flush out mercenaries. Naive arguments were put forth that this will embarrass India internationally. At times it was said that the decision was put on hold either because Prime Minister had to speak in the UN or Geneva session was on. The truth, however, remains that it was never in their scheme of things. All this because it was said too often that Kashmir was essentially a political problem and army’s role was to bring down violence to a level where political dialogue can start. This made mincemeat of our counter-insurgency strategy. Talking too often that Kashmir was a political problem sent wrong signals. The terrorists interpreted this as a sign of army fatigue.

Army also did not launch ‘seek and destroy’ operations in most of the terrorist infested areas and pursued policy of ‘recovery without losses’ in areas of inhospitable terrain. The large concentration of mercenaries in Lolab Valley, Ganderbal-belt, Aru-Pahalgam, Kokernag, Traal in Kashmir valley in itself suggests that ‘seek and destroy’ operations should have been launched long back.

Miscellaneous areas

A) Tasking problem of Troops: Results could not be qualified because there was no clarity about the tasks. Seizure of Weapons became the yardstick to please politicians. Tasking should have been in terms of controlling infiltration, denying hideouts, eliminating support structures rather than terrorists only. Army failed to built upon large-scale excesses of terrorists on Kashmiri Muslims. Counter-insurgency battle had to be waged not only on tactical front but also on psychological front. Army could have published these excesses as a matter of policy and won over the victims through rehabilitation scheme.

B) Intelligence gathering: There was virtually total collapse of intelligence in the wake of insurgency in Kashmir. The reasons were drying up of border intelligence. Army and paramilitary forces had to rebuilt it from scratch, initially from captured terrorists. Intelligence gathering continues to remain hampered due to non-protection of sources and their families, lack of adequate finance for sources, and absence of policy border management. Some damage was also caused by the politicians who had no qualms of conscience in indulging in populism on crucial security policies. Removal of Ashok Patel, who knew Kashmir like his palm at a crucial time was a monumental blunder.

C) Counter-Insurgent Groups: Till 1994 raising of these groups was not possible because there was no committed cadre available for counter-insurgency. It started when many  of the militants got disillusioned due to criminalisation of militancy and inter-group rivalries. Use of renegade militants could not be harnessed to the optimum because army had little say in group recruitment. No proper screening was done. Antecedents were not verified before recruitment. Many of the active militants got recruited. These counter-insurgents had free access to arms, including service weapons. In 1996 in Kangan these militants decamped with weapons including LMG and provided intelligence inputs to ISI. Lapse was that army had allowed them to read their routine.

For proper running of these counter-insurgent groups, unity of command was desirable. The role of these groups could have been restricted to intelligence gathering. In the management of counter-insurgent groups there was absence of uniformity of orders and higher orders were never passed down. Everybody wanted to retain them on their side. Whenever these ex-militants looted Pandits’ property, forest wealth engaged in criminal extortions and settled personal rivalries through killings, Army did not put its foot down. All this sullied the image of Army in the eyes of the common Kashmiri. Initially there was sympathy for these militants, when they acted strong enough to liberate people from extortions by terrorists. Army did not realise that overlooking all this would create anarchy.  Soon ‘renegade’ militancy turned counter-productive. Return of NC to power changed power equations. This eased pressure on Hizb and other terrorist groups. Counter-insurgents became soft targets. Many of them had to desert their homes along with  their families. There was no policy to preserve these groups as an aid to counter-insurgency. Infact, Lt. Gen. Arjun Ray went on to claim that “recycling of militants was amoral”. Airing of such views in public is definitely a bad strategy.

Another blunder was the over publicity given to counter-insurgents. It created backlash from separatists, and other mainstream political groups in Valley. Their families had to face terrorists’ and public wrath. Renegades became over-dependent on Army for survival and lost basic value of intelligence gathering.

Counter-insurgents played a very useful role but could have been used better. In the initial stage it were these people who helped gather crucial intelligence. They smashed the Jamaat-Hizb infrastructure on which the terrorist movement was sustaining. It forced Jamaat Islami cadres on the run. Creating conducive atmosphere for holding 1996 assembly elections was possible solely because of the efforts of these counter-insurgent groups.

Had there been a clear perspective, counter-insurgents could have continued to play useful role. Their services could have been harnessed to build responsible intelligence network and some operations under cover. These renegade militants were misused after they were disowned in 1998. They were distributed and every party assigned them a role that suited the particular party. The two major policy blunders were assigning them a political role as a group and secondly recruitment in Police. Recruitment of these renegades in police kept alive the risk of internal subversion. Indian state has a moral responsibility to rehabilitate these people who have abdicated militancy. It should not be done in a manner that undermines the legitimacy of the state and makes these groups controversial. Stunning disclosures by Chief Election Commissioner JM Lyngdoh that there was a plan to rig elections through police-surrendered militants nexus should serve as a warning on how to handle surrendered militants. Bad work done by these renegades and the partisan use made by opportunistic politicians has brought disrepute to all the good work done by SoG and STF wings of state police.

Ground realities

Ground situation in J&K does not indicate any improvement. Pakistan has created a war-like situation by blatantly sponsoring cross-border terrorism. Suicide attacks by terrorists on security and civilian targets are taking place on a regular basis. There is no let-up in infiltration. Area of terrorist conflict has widened and there is upgradation of terrorists' armoury. The terrorists' have been able to operate through a well-developed infrastructure of support, which includes guides/informers, harbourers and accomplices. Minority groups in Muslim-dominated areas of Jammu province continue to be under pressure. Ethnic-cleansing of Kashmiri Hindus remains unaddressed.

To what extent the war of attrition has tired down the local support for separatists is difficult to guess. However, it can be safely said that India has failed to evolve a realistic counter-insurgency doctrine to tackle terrorist menace in Kashmir. Even the Estimates Committee of Parliament in its 20th report on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) regarding policy making and system of higher direction has deprecated the lack of strategic planning and thinking at the national level. It has pointed out that directions and tasks must necessarily flow from a well-defined policy, or else the armed forces, guided by adhocism, will founder. Mr George Tanham of the Rand Corporation, the prestigious think-tank of the USA, in a study "Indian strategic thought," concluded that India has no strategic culture or tradition. It is an inward-looking country and its history, geography, culture and civilisation have shaped this tradition, he added.

The main failures of India's counter-insurgency strategy in J&K are lack of long-term strategic planning, defensive mindset built on bizarre assessments and non-coordination among different security agencies. "Proactive strategies," announced by NDA-government have remained empty rhetoric only. The security forces, operate from a defensive angle under severe stress.

The mindset of politicians has percolated down to the Army generals. ‘Kashmir is a political problem and needs to be sorted out politically’ has become new obsession. Kashmir problem is being attributed to the cumulative neglect of political, economic and social aspirations. If it is to be sorted out politically, then what should be the scope of CI operations. Obviously, to bring the separatists to the negotiating table. This dangerous mindset is responsible for not fashioning a pro-active strategy. Seek and destroy operations have thus been employed selectively and not as a regular strategy.

Separatists elements in Kashmir are waging a Jehadist war, which has transnational linkages and ramifications. Post-1973 oil boom in Gulf and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan are in the primary responsible for rise of Islamist rebellion in Kashmir. Jihadist violence has to be defeated both globally and locally. There are no short-cuts. No amount of appeasement of separatists or their sympathisers will deliver peace. This leads to one conclusion: Terrorist war has to be defeated militarily. Once it dawns on Kashmiri separatists that they are fighting a losing war, dissenting elements will come forward to wrap up the last remnants of terrorist violence. Peace with dignity and honour in essence means compromise with separatists. It is only after defeating the Jihadist war on the ground that addressing the problems of misgovernance or restoration of displaced Pandits to their homes will have meaning.

An important cause for the failure of the operations in J&K is the lack of coordination between the MoD, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Cabinet Secretariat. The formation of Unified Command was a laudable strategy but it failed to achieve its objectives. The original purpose was to reduce duplicity of efforts, have honest intelligence sharing and periodic review of CI strategies. In practice it never happened due to unnecessary local political interference. There was no clearly defined command and control mechanism and pr         oper coordination between MHA, MoD and the cabinet secretariat. BSF, Police and Army witnessed competition for credit-sharing. There was no sharing of actionable intelligence and each agency held its own terrain.

There is a war-like situation in J&K. Therefore Unified Headquarter has to be headed by a senior Army Corps Commander and coordinated at the highest level. There is a need to create a single agency for directing counter-insurgency operations. The centrally administered paramilitary forces can be put under the command of the Army to carry out internal security duties for which they are trained. The role of Rashtriya Rifles can be expanded further with integration of SOG/STF wings of state police, VDCs and SPOs. Recruitment of younger elements among VDCs and SPOs on permanent basis with better remuneration and upgraded arms would provide a strong cutting edge to CI operations, with ample actionable intelligence available. VDCs and SPOs also know the local terrain and the people better.

A realistic counter-insurgency strategy would focus on stopping infiltration, quarantining the insurgency by restricting the area in which it operates, regain control over infiltration routes in Pir Panjal, denying the hideout to the terrorists and launching seek and destroy operations to decimate the militants, ensure that suicide strikes are counter-productive to terrorists, evolving innovative intelligence strategies and lastly, neutralizing the support structures of terrorists. External components of counter-insurgency strategy to relieve pressure locally would include paying Pakistan back in the coin and destroying camps in PoK. Political content should be given to counter-insurgency and clarity of tasks and objectives should percolate down in unambiguous terms. Additionally, Army commanders should avoid controversies and dalliance with those think-tanks whose ideas are at variance with national interest. In the recent past, the army involved itself in unnecessary controversy by associating itself with a symposium in Jammu University and conducting Sadhbhavana in Turtuk (Ladakh).


From Chicken Neck to Pathankot there is a linear defence. After every hundred yards there is a security man. It is amazing how terrorists could sneak in and launch a strike at Kaluchak camp. If we are not able to manage linear defence, how can we deal with porous borders north of Chicken Neck i.e. LoC and PoK.

During the past ten years, to facilitate infiltration, ISI has created new enclaves in border areas of Jammu. As per a report, 16 Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. JBS Yadava, disturbed enough by the link between new  enclaves and spurt in terrorist activities, sent a detailed communication to the state government The commander revealed that hostile settlements had come up along the more than 36 rivers and mountain nullahas in the Samba sector, which constitute key infiltration routes into Pakistan.

The other major area of such settlements was across the National Highway, connecting Pathankot to Jammu. These settlements provided a staging post to terrorists seeking to target the Pathankot-Jammu road and railway line, as well as access to key areas in rural Jammu. Mr Praveen Swami, a senior journalist pointed out.

“Polemic apart, migration into Jammu poses several difficult questions, which need hard answers...Hysterical claims of a conspiracy to marginalise Jammu Hindus, then, are clearly misplaced. But the fact remains that the new migration does hold out security risks. The growth of Gujjar settlements along the Basantar, Aik and Devak rivers, for example, has been mirrored by a sharp increase in terrorist activities”.

From here terrorists cross to Doda, Udhampur and Bhaderwah or go north into Rajouri and Reasi. How responsive was the then ruling NC government to national security concerns, Mr Swami wrote:

“General Yadava’s letter (October, 2001) received a curt response. The J&K government argued that state subjects could settle wherever they wished, and the Army had no business to involve itself in the issue. One key point made in the 16 Corps letter, however, went unaddressed. The General had pointed out that many of the new settlements were coming up on government land, and that encroachments even in strategically-sensitive areas were being regularised. Although the letter was too polite to say so, National Conference cadre were often involved in the creation of such enclaves, brokering land sales and then promising regularisation of forest encroachments, and access to housing schemes like the Indira Awas Yojana. A Jammu-based Minister is widely believed to have encouraged supporters to start a large-scale forest fire near Sidhra earlier this year, an enterprise that was meant to clear land but went tragically wrong after three of the would be settlers accidently burnt to death.”

Despite the hurdles being created by the NC government,  the Central government did not intervene and allowed the situation to drift with its disastrous results. It did not want to annoy an ally.

The reasons often cited for continued infiltration in Jammu-Kathua belt are - availability of local guides to terrorists, lack of coordination between various intelligence agencies and dense population right upto the zero line. Till 1999, the Indo-Pak border in Kathua, which remained peaceful, was mostly used by transborder smugglers for bringing in gold and narcotics. Subsequently ISI started forcing these smugglers to also take a consignment of arms and ammunition along with the gold and narcotics. J&K Police as well as Punjab Police achieved a major success, when they seized large quantity of arms from Hiranagar on the instance of gold smugglers. Police realised the gravity of the situation only after three of the five heavily-armed militants, who sneaked into the state from across the border, were killed during a fierce encounter the same year. The remaining two terrorists were apprehended by alert villagers near Ghagwal.

There was no dearth of ideas on how to tackle the infiltration meace. There were suggestions to create a unified command of intelligence agencies, besides clearing two km. belt along the border of all inhabitants. Army had even demanded a role in administration in select border areas to track down guides and harbourers of terrorists. All this was ignored.

A border-management strategy addressing to both the human factor as well as the geography will take care of the problem of infiltration. Inducting mines along the routes witnessing heavy and regular infiltration and employing ground sensors to detect infiltrators have been often emphasised. This should be done without any delay. Resettlement of ex-servicemen to create pragmatic enclaves in border belts and bolstering of the patriotic groups has also been suggested.

Army on its part should go for effective deployment to check infiltration. Greater accountability and domination of all the infiltration routes will reduce the infiltration to a minimum. Simultaneously the GoI can maintain international pressure on Pakistan to put an end to cross-border terrorism. In case Pakistan fails to respond, capability to smash launching pads in PoK should be kept ready.

‘Fidayeen’ factor

Suicide strikes by the terrorists has costed much to the security forces. It has created fear psychosis and led to media disgrace. Casualties have increased and additional manpower had to be deployed. "Fidayeen” attacks at Raghu Nath Mandir can be explained but not on military camps. These highly motivated terrorists have been able to sneak into high security areas primarily because security of installation is not planned or lot of local civilians have access to military camps.

There is a need to curtail this civilian access to army camps. In the firstfidayeen attack on Badami Bagh Cantt, allowing access to doubtful journalists was a big security lapse. The disturbing trend is how repeatedly terrorists are gaining access to camps. Senior army officers instead of evolving a solution to this problem made irresponsible statements. "If somebody has to die he can die inside also. These strikes cannot be prevented". These statements do not add to the morale jawans.

Fidayeen attacks can be pre-empted through foolproof security of the camps, forseeing the attack and maintaining vigil on the civilian staff posted with the army. Had we foiled fidayeen strikes in the beginning, these attacks would have gone out of fashion.

Infiltration of terrorist groups

World's foremost expert on terrorism, Rohan Gunaratna says infiltration of terrorist groups is the only way to destroy these groups. This is necessary to track down harbourers and financiers of terrorists, nab the infiltrating groups, fomenting inter-group clashes among terrorists and finally creating confusion in their ranks. Additionally, this can become important and reliable source of intelligence gathering.

Seek and Destroy operations

These operations have one objective - to chase the terrorist right up to his hideout and kill him. Army had been deploying it selectively. Such operations demand national consensus as collateral damage at the initial stage is heavy. In the initial phase, army followed a policy of "recovery without losses" in Doda and the region was delivered to the terrorists. Security of Srinagar-Jammu highway was imperilled and terrorists dug deep into the adjoining Anantnag district. Minority groups in Doda became targets for ethnic-cleansing. Use of helicopters to track down mercenaries in higher reaches of Doda and upgradation of weaponry for CI operations was also not seriously pursued.

Decisive battle to decimate terrorism in Kashmir has to start from Doda. Gradually this can be extended to Kashmir valley proper.

Source: Kashmir Sentinel

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